



Study Guide

Counter-Terrorism Committee

Gimnazija Bežigrad Model United Nations



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COUNTER TERRORISM COMMITTEE – STUDY GUIDE

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INTRODUCTION

Introduction of the Chairs

Hello dear delegates, my name is Ana Ranđelović and I am a 4th year student at Gimnazija Bežigrad. My further plans consist of moving abroad in order to study law, yet I am still unsure of which law section to choose. I train taekwondo and I love to dance, in my spare time I frequently go out with my friends, read books and enjoy nature. I expect good debates, arguments and resolutions as well as good atmosphere infused with the thirst of knowledge and a wish to do your best. I hope to see people connect and unite not only for the time being, but for these connections to last through your lifetimes. I wish you a fruitful debate and extraordinary memories that you will carry back to your home.

Introduction of the topic

The richness of natural resources, although gravely important for the country's economy and development ability, represents a curse to the country possessing them. Terroristic organizations aimed at dismantling energy infrastructures, specifically the ones in relation to oil and gas are on the rise, benefiting from the country's domestic problems, most frequently civil wars. Since energy can be a useful weapon used by non-state actors to damage its target country's interests, the organizations who wish to condone to such acts mostly choose terror attacks as a mean to reach their goal. According to Wolfram Lacher and Dennis Kumetat, terror attacks aimed at North African region are infrequent and commended upon the most vulnerable infrastructures. We will be discussing political threats to energy infrastructure from terrorism and sabotage, furtherly evaluating North African and Middle Eastern countries' security of existing infrastructures and supply, particularly in the oil and gas sector.

History of the topic

The North African region and Middle East (MENA) posses around 57% of the world's proven oil reserves and 41% of proven natural gas resources. Its geographic location makes the countries a good link between Europe, Africa and the Middle East as well as an important transit corridor for global energy markets. In 2019, International Energy Agency (IEA) initiated a programme of work that would heighten institutional involvement as well as an expansion in technical activities in order to support African countries' energy strategies and aspirations. They are doing so by providing energy strategies and practises on clean energy transitions to help achieve Sustainable Development 7 (SDG 7), in which the goals are achieving increase of sustainability, ensuring universal access to affordable and modern energy sources, improving energy efficiency, enhancing international cooperation regarding the matters of clean energy and expand infrastructure as well as technology related to energy services by the year 2030. The countries affluent with oil and gas are primarily Algeria, Libya and Egypt, whose main export material is hydrocarbon, as its reserves are abundant and widely spread across the range of reservoirs throughout the landscape. In 2013, Algeria suffered a terror attack conducted by the Al-Qaeda on its Tiguentourine gas plant, which is one of the top gas suppliers in Europe. Along with this attack came several security plans in order to make the breaches and attack as uncommon as possible.

Libya holds the largest amount of crude oil reserves in Africa and along with that became one of the largest suppliers of crude oil to Europe and Middle East. In 2011, Libya suffered a drop in hydrocarbon production due to the civil war that ended the same year with some unresolved issues that led to their second civil war in 2014. In response to this matter, IEA provided 60 barrels of oil from their emergency stocks of its member countries in the mission called Libya Collective Action. The oil and natural gas fall in 2011 led to an immensely drop of GDP, for it has declined by 60%. From then on, their production restored itself throughout numeric economic help, however it is not as substantial as it was.

The country that plays a vital role in the international energy market through its possession of the Suez Canal and the Suez Mediterranean Pipeline (SUMED) is Egypt. The canals offer an important transit route for oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) through the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America. They, however, suffered a similar fate as Libya in 2011 revolution which led in an abrupt decline of LNG production by which they became a gas importer rather than a gas exporter. In 2015, an Italian company Eni discovered a mass gas field on the shore of Zohr and with its production, Egypt returned to the market as one of the main gas exporters.

Nowadays, the countries have centred themselves into exploitation of renewable energy. By the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), the renewable energy market in North Africa is expected to grow by 6% in the period 2020 – 2025, in which supportive government policies will play an important factor. It is estimate that Egypt will dominate the market. It has made great strides toward meeting its goal of 7 GW of wind energy by 2022 with the launch of the 262.5 MW Ras Ghareb Wind Farm project in November 2019. By 2022 and 42%, respectively, of Egypt's electricity will come from renewable sources, according to the country's Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy 2035. By 2035, 61000 MW of renewable capacity will be constructed, including 31,000 MW from solar energy, 12,000 MW from CSP, and 18,000 MW from wind energy.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Iraq and Syria are the current epicentre of the Islamist extremist movement and along with that, Al-Qaeda and ISIS are among the top terror groups operating in North Africa. According to a document regarding the terrorist attacks in the MENA region published by Cambridge University Press, Algeria, Libya and Egypt all have a high-risk level based on their country's performance with all of them scoring poorly in the governance sector.

One of the governance critical risks represents regulatory quality as well as political stability and violence. That fact alone coordinates with an idea described by Wolfram Lacher and Dennis Kumetat regarding terror groups attacking vulnerable infrastructures in countries threatened by civil war and coup d'états.

In 2013, for instance, there were 51 terrorist attacks committed in Algeria, 146 in Libya, and 17 in Tunisia, including kidnappings, murders, bombings, and direct assaults on government buildings and personnel. These numbers are the highest since 2001. Extremist and terrorist groups are carrying out assaults inside Egypt, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, where there is a high level of instability.

Complex regional dynamics in Algeria have created a system where ideology, ethnicity, economic factors, and criminality are intricately intertwined. The fall of the Libyan state in 2011 and the insurgency in northern Mali have both contributed to a rise in insecurity in Algeria in recent years. The most well-known attack on electricity infrastructure in recent years occurred in Algeria. The terrorist attack at Tiguentourine, close to In Amenas, that claimed the lives of 11 Algerians and 37 foreigners was claimed by the Al Mulathameen Battalion, an AQIM splinter group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

Due to the civil crisis in Libya, the situation is much more complicated. In the power vacuum challenging the new Libyan administration, a number of terrorist groups have surfaced, making use of tiny arms smuggled from the armories of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. To undermine the government and further their own political goals, militias and terrorist organizations are focusing on Libya's energy facilities. The more volatile section of the nation is in the east, where rebels fiercely resisted Gaddafi's reign and are now attempting to utilize oil riches to secure political autonomy for the Cyrenaica coastline region. Some of Libya's major oil and gas ports, including those in Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, and Zuetina, have been in the control of the rebels. Then it must be noted that, in addition to rebels, ethnic minorities like Berbers and Toubous have attacked Libya's energy infrastructures in order to demand the recognition of their minority rights.

In a similar vein, Egypt has experienced numerous attacks on its energy infrastructure, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, which is frequently viewed as a good platform to engage in conflict with both Israel and the Egyptian government. Between January 2011 and July 2012, the gas pipeline that connects Egypt to Israel and Jordan, for instance, was attacked 15 times. Terrorists attacked a pipeline close to the El Arish natural gas compressor facility in February 2011, disrupting supplies. Other attacks against the pipelines close to Al-Sabil village in the El-Arish region and close to Nagah occurred in April and July of 2011. Due to these actions, Egypt's natural gas supply to Israel was completely cut off as well as severely disrupted in its flow to Jordan. With four strikes against the Arab Gas pipeline in 2014, the attacks have once more risen.

Important chokepoints in the area include the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline, which serve as vital routes for shipping Persian Gulf oil and gas to Europe and North America. The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline have not, however, been assaulted despite the numerous strikes that have hit the Sinai Peninsula, indicating a lack of motivation or capacity to carry out operations against these targets thus far.

ISSUES TO ADDRESS

Terrorist groups are increasingly considering the strategy of attacking energy infrastructure because the attacks can disrupt energy flows, deprive states of a significant source of revenue, and lessen the legitimacy of governments by exposing their inability to protect a crucial area of the economy. Thus, energy infrastructure can serve as both a communication channel with governments and a means of influencing their economic interests, as well as a source of power and revenue, for potential attackers. Terrorist organizations with a local objective, as is the situation in Egypt or Algeria, or militant organizations engaged in a civil war, as is the case in

Libya, are the groups responsible for assaults against energy infrastructure in North Africa. Ansar Beit Maqdis, for instance, is the primary actor in attacks against pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and Bedouin have frequently worked with these actors due to their long-standing grievances against the Cairo government. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the attacks have all primarily had local or regional repercussions.

Both the targeted nations and the countries that import energy have undoubtedly suffered significant economic losses as a result of the strikes in North Africa. Abdoullah Ensour, the prime minister of Jordan, noted that Jordan might have suffered losses of between US\$ 4-5 billion as a result of the attacks on the energy infrastructure in Egypt. The governments of the region, particularly those of Libya and Algeria, bear the heavier burden of terrorism against energy facilities and suffer significantly decreased revenue. Due to the civil war and terrorism in Libya, energy production has drastically decreased from 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in July 2013 to 250,000 bpd in December 2013, which might cause the GDP to decline by 5.1%. The 2011 civil conflict caused a decline in oil and natural gas production, which reduced real GDP by 62% for the year. The attack on the oil complex in In Amenas is thought to have cost Algeria more than \$10 million per day in lost revenue for a number of months. (22) These findings demonstrate how seriously the stability and security of those nations can be impacted by a significant interruption in oil or gas production.

The development of new facilities may be negatively impacted by the deterioration of the security situation in North Africa, which would reduce foreign investment. The attacks—or even the fear of such attacks—have in part made it difficult and unattractive for international businesses to invest in the region. For instance, the construction of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline has been delayed due to security worries about militant groups operating in distant Sahel regions, which poses significant risks to investors interested in funding the project. BP has not curtailed its operations in Algeria as a result of the In Amenas attack, but it may reconsider growing them and ceasing future gas exploration in North Africa. The same might be done by other energy firms operating in the area, such as Statoil, Total, and ENI SpA. For North Africa, which depends on technology and international investment to develop its massive resources, this might be very bad news.

Although the attacks have had significant effects on North African countries, they have not yet been able to have a significant impact on European or global energy security. Since energy sources may be quickly replenished, one-time attacks are unlikely to result in significant economic harm or long-lasting outages. Gas export flows swiftly resumed even in the event of the In Amenas attack. Only coordinated and simultaneous strikes might have serious repercussions, raising energy prices and jeopardizing the economic recovery and growth that appears to have begun in several European and US countries. However, at this time, it appears that the core of al-Qaeda is the only entity with a global objective who might be willing to carry out such a planned strike. There is proof that al-Qaeda considers energy infrastructure assaults as a means of waging war against Western nations, Israel, and "apostate states." Al-Qaeda has a "continued interest" in striking facilities that produce oil and natural gas, according to the US Department of Homeland Security's 2011 report. Al-leadership Qaeda's encouraged the preservation of the oil wealth in Arab nations in 1996, but starting in 2002,

they changed their stance in order to harm the US by attacking global energy interests. The al-Qaeda core, however, doesn't appear to be interested in or capable of mounting a significant campaign against energy targets in North Africa at this moment, despite its rhetoric and its potential support for associated groups carrying out strikes against energy infrastructure.

PAST ACTIONS OF THE UN

On November 22, 2016, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, as in the case of ISIL activities, controlling dams has frequently been a strategic terrorist objective. ISIL exploited water as a target and a weapon, according to Stratfor. In addition to destroying water-related infrastructure including pipes, sewage facilities, and bridges, ISIL has also flooded towns on purpose, polluted waterways, and ruined local economies by interfering with agriculture and electricity production. ISIL reportedly carried out dozens of smaller attacks against the water infrastructure in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2015, including flooding villages, threatening to flood Baghdad, shutting down the dam gates in Fallujah and Ramadi, cutting off water to Mosul, and allegedly poisoning water in small Syrian towns.

The General Assembly encouraged the Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact entities to "work closely with Member States and relevant international, regional, and subregional organizations to identify and share best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets, such as critical infrastructure and public places" at its seventh review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In this faith, they have conducted a 5-step guide that focuses on the protection of urban centres, tourist sites, religious sites and aircraft systems.

FURTHER READING

- *Physical protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks:*
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted-trends-report-march-2017-final.pdf>.
- *Reports regarding the terrorist attacks conducted by the CTC:*
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/publications?utm_source=UNOCT.

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